

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-13

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 SAM-01 EA-11 EUR-25 AID-20 IO-14 DRC-01 EB-11

TRSE-00 COME-00 /174 W

----- 121327

P 110950Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2737

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 1042

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CENTO

SUBJ: CENTO SITUATION PAPER (REVISION NO. 4)

1. WORKING GROUP MET FOR FOUR HOURS FEB 8 AND DISPOSED OF ALL PROPOSALS TO REVISION NO. 4 OF SITUATION PAPER MADE BY UK, IRAN, PAKISTAN AND TURKEY. GROUP DISCUSSED WHETHER TO ISSUE REVISION NO. 5 IN ABSENCE OF WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON REVISION NO. 4 AND EVEN WHETHER IT SHOULD BE OFFERED TO COUNCIL OF DEPUTIES TO IRON OUT REMAINING DISPUTES. CONSENSUS WAS NEGATIVE TO BOTH IDEAS BUT ALL IMPRESSED ON USG REP THE DESIRABILITY OF REVIEWING USG PROPOSALS SOONEST IN LIGHT OF FACT THAT PAKISTAN, IRAN AND UK COMMUNICATE WITH THEIR CAPITALS ON THIS SUBJECT BY DIPLOMATIC POUCH RATHER THAN BY CABLE AND THIS TAKES TIME.

2. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT THE FINAL PAPER COULD IF NECESSARY CONTAIN FOOTNOTES TO SHOW THE MINORITY VIEWPOINT ON CONTENTIOUS ISSUES, WITH THE THOUGHT THAT THE COUNCIL OF DEPUTIES MIGHT AGREE ON THEIR EXCLUSION IN ITS EXAMINATION OF THE PAPER.

3. IRANIAN REP INDICATED THAT HIS GOVT HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT

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ALL THE CONCLUSIONS PORTION, BUT ESPECIALLY PARA 47(C) RE

DENTE. THE LATEST PAKISTANI AMENDMENTS WERE GENERALLY UNHELPFUL. BY SEEKING TO CUT OUT LANGUAGE RE CHINESE INFLUENCE OR CHINESE PENETRATION OF THE AREA, THE PAKISTANIS RAISED SUSPICIONS AMONG THE TURKS THAT THIS SITUATION PAPER MAY EVENTUALLY BE LEAKED TO OTHER GOVTs.

4. DEPARTMENT MAY BE INTERESTED IN FOLLOWING ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF THE KINDS OF AMENDMENTS THE PAKS HAVE PROPOSED. THIS DEALS WITH INDIA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN PARA 37, AND WE AND UK REP FLATLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER IT. "INDIA HAS DEVELOPED A NUCLEAR OPTION BUT SO FAR THERE ARE NO CLEAR SIGNS THAT IT HAS DECIDED TO EXERCISE IT."

5. FOLLOWING AMENDMENTS ARE KEYED TO PARA NUMBERS IN REVISION NO. 4:

1. DELETE "WHICH THEY POSE" IN FIRST SENTENCE.  
SUBSTITUTE "ACTIVITIES OF" FOR "THREAT FROM".

4. ADD TO END OF LAST SENTENCE "AS EVIDENCED BY ITS ROLE IN THE INDO-PAK WAR OF 1971."

29. NOW READ AS FOLLOWS: "THE MAIN AIM OF THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN IS TO ENSURE A FRIENDLY STATE AMENABLE TO SOVIET INFLUENCE. RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN HAVE BEEN MARKED BY AN ATTITUDE OF EITHER LATENT OR OPEN HOSTILITY ON THE PART OF AFGHANISTAN . DESPITE ITS TRADITIONAL NON-ALIGNED POSTURE IN FOREIGN POLICY OVER THE YEARS, THESE POOR RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN HAVE ALSO HELPED DRAW AFGHANISTAN INTO A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR. SOVIET POLICY HAS BEEN CALCULATED TO BENEFIT FROM AFGHAN-PAKISTAN ANTAGONISM. WHEN PAKISTAN JOINED CENTO, THE USSR GAVE GENERAL SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN'S CLAIM ABOUT PUSHTUNISTAN. IN THE MID-1950'S, THE SOVIET UNION BEGAN TO PROVIDE LARGE-SCALE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ITS SOUTHERN NEIGHBOR. ALTHOUGH NO EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE OF ACTIVE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE COUP D'ETAT OF JULY 17, 1913, BRINGING MOHAMMAD DAUD TO POWER, THE SOVIETS ALMOST CERTAINLY HAD PRIOR KNOWLEDGE. IT IS APPARENT THAT DAUD'S MAJOR EXTERNAL PREOCCUPATION IS THE "SETTLEMENT OF THE PUSHTUNISTAN

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ISSUE" WITH PAKISTAN. THERE HAVE BEEN, HOWEVER, SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE USSR MAY BE COUNSELLING MODERATION ON THIS ISSUE, AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT. SINCE ASSUMING POWER DAUD HAS STEPPED UP ANTI-PAKISTAN PROPAGANDA AND HAS GIVEN ENCOURAGEMENT TO SECCESIONIST ELEMENTS IN PAKISTAN'S NORTHWEST FRONTIER AND BALUCHISTAN PROVINCES. WHILE THE AFGHANS HAVE NOT YET APPEARED TO BE WILLING TO PUSH THE (PUSHTUNISTAN) ISSUE TO THE POINT OF DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH PAKISTAN THEY

CONTINUE TO TALK PUBLICLY ABOUT THE ISSUE IN WAYS THAT ARE UNDERSTANDABLE VIEWED BY PAKISTAN AS INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERANAL AFFAIRS." (REST OF PARA IS THE SAME AS ORIGINAL VERSION, EXCEPT FOR ADDITION OF FINAL SENTENCE AS FOLLOWS:

"THERE HAS HOWEVER BEEN SOME RECENT EVIDENCE OF AFGHANISTAN ADOPTING A MORE RESTRAINED LINE ON THIS ISSUE: PERHAPS AS A RESULT OF SOVIET COUNCIL AS MENTIONED ABOVE."

30. FIRST TWO SENTENCES NOW READ: "THE SOVIETS RECENTLY HAVE SENT A HIGH LEVEL MISSION TO AFGHANISTAN, ONE OF WHOSE PURPOSES WAS REPORTED TO BE THE REORGANIZATION AND MODERNIZATION OF THE AFGHAN FORCES. THERE IS NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ENCOURAGING AFGHAN ADVENTURISM ON PUSHTUNISTAN; HOWEVER, THE USSR'S DESIRE FOR EXPANDED INFLUENCE WITH THE DAUD GOVERNMENT AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT TO THE AFGHAN MILITARY MAY AMOUNT

TO INDIRECT SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN AGITATION AGAINST PAKISTAN."

34. FIRST TWO SENTENCES THE SAME. REST READS:

"DURING THIS VISIT, TWO ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS AND ONE CONSULAR AGREEMENT WERE SIGNED WHICH MAY STRENGTHEN INDO-SOVIET COOPERATION. A LARGE WHEAT LOAN OF TWO MILLION TONS TO INDIA WAS AGREED UPON EARLIER IN THE AUTUMN. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM APPARENTLY WAS DESCRIBED BY THE SOVIETS BUT WAS NOT DISCUSSED DURING THE VISIT AND INDIA HAS BEEN AT PAINS TO STATE THAT SHE HAS NOT ENDORSED THIS SYSTEM (FOOTNOTE: ACCORDING TO THE PAK GOVT, INDIA'S TACIT SUPPORT TO THAT ARRANGEMENT CANNOT, HOWEVER, BE RULED OUT. END FOOTNOTE) AS A RESULT OF THIS VISIT,

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NEW EMPHASIS IS BEING PLACED ON INDO-SOVIET RELATION AND THUS ON THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY OF 1971. THE SOVIETS CLAIM THAT THIS VISIT WAS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE, ALTHOUGH THE INDIAN'S HAVE STRESSED THAT INDIA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE WAS NOT COMPROMISED AS A RESULT."

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ACTION NEA-13

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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2738

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 1042

35. CHARGE QUOTE 1965 UNQUOTE TO QUOTE 1960

UNQUOTE IN FIRST SENTENCE.

38. SUBSTITUTE FOR QUOTE ENCHANCED VIS-A-VIS UNQUOTE

QUOTE RELATIVELY GREATER THAN IT HAS BEEN, COMPARED WITH  
UNQUOTE.

NEW PARA 41(TURK PROPOSAL): QUOTE THE PLIGHT OF  
THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES HWE BEEN A CONTINUING CAUSE OF  
POLITICAL UNREST, AND THIS HAS PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR  
SOVIET AND CHINESE SUPPORT FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE  
AREA. A JUST MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, WHICH TAKES CARE  
OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, MAY HELP CURTAIL THESE  
ACTIVITIES ALONG WITH COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE REGION.  
THE SOVIETS WILL KEEP THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PLO  
AND INDICATIONS ARE THAT THEY WILL ALSO TRY TO KEEP THE  
PALESTINIAN QUESTION ALIVE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN, IF NOT  
STRENTHTEN, THEIR POSITION IN THE AREA. UNQUOTE

43. TURK PROPOSAL (ANKARA 431) ACCEPTED.

47(B). ELIMINATE QUOTE MOST UNQUOTE FORM FIRST  
SENTENCE. INSERT AFTER QUOTE MILITARY INTERVENTION  
UNQUOTE IN SECOND SENTENCE QUOTE DIRECT OR INDIRECT

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UNQUOTE.

47(K). PAKS OBJECTED TO TURK PROPOSAL (ANKARA 431)  
AND COMPAROMISE WORKED OUT AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE WHILE  
NO COUNTRY COULD BE EXPECTED TO ADOPT A POLICY CONTRARY  
TO WHAT IT REGARDS AS ITS VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS, THE  
PROMOTION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN REGIONAL CENTO  
MEMBERS AND REGIONAL NON-CENTO COUNTRIES WOULD  
HELP CURTAIL SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE AREA. UNQUOTE  
THIS WILL BECOME THE PENULTIMATE SUB-PARA, WITH USG  
SUB-PARA J COMING AT THE VERY END.

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## Message Attributes

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